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COUNTRY  1938  1947  1948  1949  1950 
Belgium  100  106  114  116  120 
France  100  92  108  118  121 
Germany, West  100  33  50  75  96 
Italy  100  86  91  96  109 
Netherlands  100  95  113  127  139 
United Kingdom  100  115  128  137  150 













































































































Country  Feb­10  % of Total  9­Feb  % of Total 
China  877.5  23.40%  744.2  23.54% 
Japan  768.5  20.49%  661.9  20.90% 
United Kingdom  231.7  6.18%  129  4.08% 
Oil Exporters  218.8  5.83%  181.8  5.75% 
Brazil  170.8  4.55%  130.8  4.14% 
Hong Kong  152.4  4.06%  76.3  2.41% 
Carib Banking Cntrs  144.5  3.85%  189.5  5.99% 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Taiwan  121.4  3.24%  72.6  2.30% 
Russia  120.2  3.20%  130.1  4.11% 
All others  944.2  25.18%  845.3  26.74% 
Grand Total  3750.5    3161.5   
Major Foreign Holders of Treasury Securities, www.treas.gov/tic/mfh.txt 
As the table illustrates, China and Japan are the two largest holders of foreign debt, with a total of around 44%. They allow the United States to run such a high debt because the US is such a strong economy and such a large customer that they want them to continue buying exports. Overall, the amount of foreign investing in US Treasury securities has increased by almost double. The current figure, as previously mentioned, is 25%, but it was less than 13% in 1988 (Treasury Report 5). Government debt is inherently not a problem. The problem is when these foreign securities turn into a national economic and security issue. 
  China and U.S. Economic Relations. The Chinese economy was around $8.8 trillion in 2009, thus making China the world’s third largest economy, right after the United States and the European Union (Amadeo 1). It is also the world’s second largest exporter (right after the EU), and the U.S. in particular relies heavily on the Chinese exports. Reversely, the Chinese also rely heavily on the United States, but as time goes on, this lessens. China has recently been increasing trade with Hong Kong and Japan, as well as the African and Latin American countries. Yet the standard of living is relatively low in China, which they use as a method to keep labor, and in 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turn exports, cheap. It depends on keeping the value of the yuan low, and in order to do this, it needs to keep the value of the dollar high. A low yuan ensures cheap labor, and the Chinese have managed to keep this a reality despite US pressure to raise the competiveness of the yuan in an effort to improve American competitiveness. China has also fixed the value of its currency to the dollar. Currently, the dollar is worth around 6.8 yuan (Amadeo 1). If China were to let their currency float, many analysts believe it would be more valuable than the dollar due to the strong Chinese economy. Yet China keep its pegged in order to, once again, ensure cheaper products than the US, thus keeping export and trade deficit with the U.S. 
  Even beyond the US Treasury securities debate, the economic relationship between the United States and China is tense, at best. While the details of these tensions are beyond the scope of this paper, the mood surrounding the securities debate play a large role, and the past tensions play a role in this mood. So its important to understand the level of competition that exists between the two countries. The United States is the leading world power, and China is the rapidly growing threat. The United States has developed to the point that it is no longer a huge manufacturer and is instead moving towards a service based society. China manufacturers the goods that the United States needs and at the same time, relies on the money the US pays for the goods. Congress is continually accusing China of surpassing import quotas, and China is constantly accusing the United States of protectionism. This tense economic relationship will continue to exist for so long as the two countries need each other, but the question is what happens to the US if China reaches a point where they no longer are in need of the US? 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 The Current Situation. With all these factors coming into play, the current situation is particularly tense. The financial crisis has highlighted these tensions to the point that many economists are concerned. Early this year, China began to sell U.S. securities, and they have currently fallen by $62.4 billion since last July (Craft 1). Bond markets haven’t yet crashed due to Japan, the UK, and oil exporting countries picking up the slack and adding around $258 billion to their combined holdings (Craft 1). Even so recently as February, China trimmed its holding of US Treasury debt by 1.3 percent, making it the fourth consecutive decline (Crutsinger 1). 
  In an article by the Associated Press, Win Thin, a senior currency strategist at Brown Brother Harriman & Company said that he believed “the March report could well show a rebound in purchases by China…[and] that part of the changes [in the past terms] reflected a decision by China to rebalance its holdings away from shorter‐term Treasury bills” (Crutsinger 1). He maintains that China is “still a stead buyer of U.S. Treasury notes and bonds but has [simply] been paring back its Treasury‐bill holdings” (1).  Another explanation is that Chinese investors may be simply buying their securities through Britain and Hong Kong (Crutsinger 1).  
Despite these reassurances, however, the problem remains. Unless foreign demand for U.S. Treasury debt remains strong, the interest rates that the government pays on the debt could rise exponentially, thus making the deficit of the United States even worse. These rising interest rates would also put an upward pressure on private debt (Crutsinger 1). This upward trend in borrowing costs would affect U.S. businesses and consumers. Higher costs lead to lower consumption 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and lower borrowing/lending. It could ultimately freeze up the credit lanes, which would add another risk to the U.S. economy. 
  Furthermore, as the debate about what China is doing with their holdings rages onward, the United States is also increasingly concerned about the Chinese allowing the yuan to rise in value against the dollar. By doing so, they are keeping the currency artificially low and harming US economic international growth. It is estimated that by doing so, it would add an estimated $2.4 trillion to the world’s supply of Treasury debt this year (Craft 1). President Barack Obama has addressed this issue. He met with President Hu Jintao of China the week of April 13th in an effort to “move toward a more market‐oriented exchange rate” (Mr Obama and Mr. Hu 1). Mr. Hu reportedly responded that China did plan to move away from the fixed currency peg, but did not say when. China did report that they would not be responding to foreign pressure, the decision would be made on their own time frame. 
The Role of Sovereign Wealth Funds. Another point of contention in terms of Chinese‐US economic relations are sovereign wealth funds. Until recently, China, Japan, and other exporters have been content with keeping “most of their trillions of dollars in reserves in safe investments like bank deposits and United States Treasury debt” (Times 1). As previously demonstrated, these holdings are currently in doubt, but analysts aren’t entirely sure where the next step for China would be. As the investment in US treasury debt declines, the investment into the private sectors for higher returns is increasing. With this huge base, government investors diversity 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more and can risk higher yielding options. These highly diverse, national funds are called sovereign wealth funds. 
The term, according to the New York Times, applies “to government‐owned funds set up by the world’s leading exporters, especially China and the major oil producers, that are being employed more assertively for investment in banks, private companies, equity funds, real property and other assets” (1). The funds gained in popularity during the pre‐financial crisis years of 2006 and 2007. Many saw the funds as engaging in “cross border nationalization” (Sovereign Wealth Funds 1). This was concerning due to the power that the home government of the sovereign wealth funds might have in the countries where they invest. The Western world is particularly concerned due largely to the fact that the countries yielding these funds aren’t the most stable, or friendly, of allies. Political leaders are concerned that these funds are concealing attempts to invest for political gain or influence. 
The role of these institutions has been severely diminished in the wake of the financial crisis of 2008. Many of these sovereign wealth funds had invested heavily in institutions that went south. Of particular interest here is the China Investment Corporation, the Chinese SWF. They originally had a $3 billion investment in Blackstone Group, but when the group turned downward, the Chinese government lost a degree of latitude. Other SWF’s have done much better. The sovereign wealth fund of Kuwait made “a profit of $1.1 billion on its $3 billion investment in Citigroup” (Times 1). 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Concern still exists, however, despite the decline of China’s SWF in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis. The Peterson Institute of International Economics currently says that the biggest SWF’s are owned respectively by United Arab Emirates, Singapore, Norway, Kuwait, Russia, and China. It wouldn’t be surprising to see China soon take the lead here due to their $1.3 trillion in foreign exchange reserves. Given the concerns of the Western world about the political influence of such funds, this is not an ideal situation for the United States. The Chinese government already owns 20% of United States foreign debt, and to increase their power with politically placed, powerful funds, wouldn’t bode well for national or economic security. 
What this means for the United States and the rest of the world. As of now, there is no danger of the Chinese selling off their current hold of US Treasury debt. The United States and China are still heavily reliant upon each other, and the US dollar maintains a stronghold in the world economy. However, imagining the worst, if the Chinese sold all of their US debt, the dollar would collapse, sending the United States into a recession never before seen. This is most improbable. 
The rest of the world is also affected by the growing debt problems of not just the United States, but a variety of countries. There have been sharp rises in government debt in general, not just the chronic problem of the United States, and many institutions, the IMF included, are concerned about growing sovereign risk. Slow growth in the real economy and high levels of unemployment (and the “jobless 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recovery”) will keep tax revenues low and thus require higher government spending to help counteract this.  
I include this just to prove the point that despite recent improvements in economic forecasting, the financial system has yet to be restored. Quality must be improved in a variety of areas, but until it is, investors remain jittery. As they worry about long‐run government solvency, bond prices could decline in the most advanced economies. If this were to happen, banks, especially those just recovering from the most recent series of hits, could face even new hits. Rising interest costs on public debt also factor here as they could flow through the private sector, raising borrowing costs for all involved (Rowe 1). The relations with China affect all of this, and it highlights the interconnectedness of the economies and the international monetary system today. 
A Reformed Monetary System 
As the previous two sections highlight, the world is currently undergoing a series of changes. Europe is facing its own internal debt crisis, but the fact that it is the world’s largest exporter, and one of the largest economic blocs in the world, make the issue international. The same holds true for Chinese‐U.S. economic relations. The financial crisis has made this situation much worse, and the international monetary system is teetering on the edge of collapse. As the background section highlighted, there have been definitive moments of change in the history of the monetary system. This is one of those moments. Before the system collapses around us, a new system must be enacted. The ideas for such a system have long been debated, but 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here I will outline what I see as some of the more feasible options. The bulk of my thesis has been devoted to proving that there was a reason to change so a large, detailed section here is beyond the scope of my research. Because of this I will highlight a only a few ideas. 
  The need for a revised system has been noted by several world leaders. Nicolas Sarkozy has said, “we must rethink the financial system from scratch, as at Bretton Woods” (Eurodad 1). Furthermore, at the G20 conference this year, a realignment of currency exchange rates was discussed. Most recently, Prime Minister Papandreou of Greece wrote an op‐ed in the International Herald Tribune. He wrote the following: 
“Democratic governments worldwide must establish a new global financial architecture, as bold in its own way as Bretton Woods, as bold as the creation of the European Community and European Monetary Union. And we need it fast. Only this will build a new confidence and fairness that our citizens can trust, and that can prevent each new crisis from becoming an epidemic” (Papandreou 1). 
 
The desire to recreate the international monetary system is there, but now the cooperation of the world is necessary. 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 The first of these reformation ideas was promoted by World Bank president Robert Zoellick. In a speech during 2008, he called for a “new multilateral network for a new global economy” (Eurodad 1). Essentially, the G7 is not working, and it is an outdated mode of viewing the world. Zoellick suggested a new steering group including the nations of Brazil, China, India, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, as well as the current G7 members. Yet it is important to recognize that simply putting new countries on the “steering group” will not remake the system. It would simply be updating an old and tired system. The system needs to be reevaluated on a ten‐year basis as to note the growths in the world.  
  The IMF must also be reformed. The financial sector assessment program was launched by the IMF just after the Asian financial crisis in an effort to identify the risks and problems in bank regulation. The United States proved to be difficult in these negotiations and only signed on around 2007. The IMF, which has been frequently criticized for being under the thumb of the United States, recognized the slowdown in the recent US housing market collapse well before the collapse actually took place. It noted that “this weakness has been contained to certain portions of the subprime market…, and is not likely to pose a series systematic threat” (Eurodad 1). Obviously, this prediction failed to happen. Developed, economic powerhouses are used to conducting the world’s economic direction, and the institutions designed to help the underdeveloped, such as the IMF and World Bank, are reluctant or unable to prevent this. The recent Financial Stability Report has indicated that the “financial crisis that emerged from the United States has established a very challenging environment for some countries, especially those with a greater reliance on short‐
Karczmarczyk  62 
term flow or with leveraged banking system funded internationally” (Eurodad 1). The IMF failed to act on what would eventually become the global financial crisis of 2008. The actualities of reform are well beyond the scope of this paper, but the point I hope to make is that critical need with which it must be done. 
  The original ideas of the IMF remain sound, however, and many countries would  like to see an enhanced role for the IMF just in a different capacity. The IMF could be used to “improve surveillance of complex financial markets and help prevent such excesses building up in the future” (Seager 1). The role of the IMF needs to be once again clearly defined. They have in recent years morphed into a similar institution as the World Bank when in reality they were designed to do entirely different things. The IMF should be in charge of regulating the financial markets, which have in recent years been far too weak. The resulting global financial crisis has proven this. Yet such an organization as the IMF could “force banks to hold greater capital cushions or make them pay bonuses in shares that would be held in a company, for say five years, to make sure it was the longer‐term interests of the shareholders that was the focus rather than the banker’s short term interests” (Seager 1). Basically, I see the IMF performing the role as an international regulator. 
  The World Bank is also in dire need of reform. Many of the policies proposed by the Bank for poverty alleviation in the global south have disastrous effects on the environment. The large infrastructure projects its promotes adhere to Western values and ideals, and in many cases have proved to be “economically unsound, destroyed pristine rainforest, rivers, and estuaries, and have uprooted the 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livelihoods of millions of Third world citizens who are affected by them (Chebucto 1). The World Bank Structural Adjustment Programs have also recently come under fire for their environmental unacceptability and their adherence to Western economics. 
  Before implanting these reforms, however, we must first rid ourselves of the global financial crisis that plagues the world. Unsustainable debt has become a problem, and the countries that have a surplus, i.e. Germany, must step in to help solve this short‐term liquidity crisis. This is obviously a very complex idea and issue with much to be said. Yet, once the world has worked through these issues, then we can step up and do the reformations necessary. 
  In conclusion of this section, I would like to say that these are simply ideas, not a concrete plan of reformation. A concrete plan would require years of thought. A policy idea gone right usually takes time and many small scale tests. As this is the entire international monetary system that we are discussion, I would advocate nothing less. 
Conclusion 
The international monetary system has come a long way since the early days of the gold standard. It began with the gold standard in the 1800s, has been interrupted by two major world wars, created two of the largest financial institutions the world has ever seen, and weathered multiple financial crises. Yet as we approach the next era, it is questionable as to whether the system as it is today can exist. The euro crisis and the Chinese holding of US Treasury debt are two of the largest issues the system 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has ever faced, and when we look back on the history of the system, it can be seen that in times of big issues, the system changes irrevocably. 
  With this in mind, it is time that we begin to formulate the system in the way that is best for the world, and not simply let what happens happen. As the 1970s indicated, this is not necessarily the best mode of action. We did that then and ended up with the highly volatile system that we have today. The time for action and creation is now. 
  The ultimate goal of this thesis was to highlight this urgency. The system has evolved considerably and it is yet to finish. So long as we live in a global world, there will be a need for a global system, and unlike ever before, its time to create a truly equalized, globalized international financial system. 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